

9 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM:

[Redacted]

25X1

Policy and Plans Group

SUBJECT:

Reward for Agency Employees and Agency  
Contractors' Employees Providing Information  
on Espionage Activities

1. As requested, attached are two proposed versions of a recommendation regarding Subject to be forwarded to the DCI. Staff research has come up with the following considerations:

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CONFIDENTIAL



DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-A-277  
10 July 1985

AGENDA  
Two Hundred and Eighty-sixth Meeting  
Wednesday, 24 July 1985, 10:00 AM  
Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters

Preliminary Comments (e.g. budget, proposed NSDD on overseas security,  
Chairman's brief of SSCI Staffers)

- ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 26 June 1985 meeting
- ITEM 2 Discussion and Approval of revised Par. 11, DCID 1/14
- ITEM 3 Discussion of assignment of responsibilities and accreditations  
regarding SCIFs
- ITEM 4 SECOM Staffing
- ITEM 5 New Business
- ITEM 6 Next Meeting (10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 21 August 1985, Room 7D32  
CIA Headquarters)



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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

SECOM Budget proposals have had some recent activity with the IC Staff. SECOM has been asked to resubmit those proposals after the first group of proposals was turned down by the IC Staff last Monday. After SECOM conversations with the IC Staff, it became apparent that although the SECOM submissions were made on 10 April to the IC Staff, the submissions had somehow "fallen through the cracks." C/SECOM will give a progress report at this meeting.

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The proposed NDSS on overseas security is being coordinated this date (17 July) with member Agencies. The final DDA version is being hand carried by [ ] for review and comment. C/SECOM will comment on the status.

Chairman's brief of SSCI staffers will be a topic for preliminary commentary.

ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes for 26 June 1985 meeting

Action Taken regarding the Minutes -

- ° Harassments and Provocations study forwarded to appropriate offices for input. SECOM has granted us an extension of the deadline to 20 August since SAG asked for more time.

- ° DOE presentation on CULTS notice was forwarded to PSI components and SEG.

- ° SAG notified of termination of Project Slammer.

ITEM 2 Discussion and Approval of Paragraph 11, DCID 1/14.

Agency response attached as TAB A. We suggested the addition of the words "prior to" to paragraph one of the document rather than "immediately following," as it refers to the time element for reporting such outside activities. We also suggested highlighting of the prepublication review provision. Concurred with the rest of the addition.

ITEM 3 Discussion of assignment of responsibilities and accreditations regarding SCIFs.

STAT

[ ] has brought this to the attention of the Computer Security Subcommittee. SECOM staff has not had sufficient time to research the topic and will suggest a working group be formed to conduct such research. Al Petit will ask for deferral of discussion of the topic until the

August meeting. [ ] forwarded a short memorandum to PPG (attached as TAB B) explaining the issue of assignment of responsibilities and accreditations regarding SCIFs.

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ITEM 4      SECOM Staffing - Discussion of a replacement for Bob Murray.

ITEM 5      New Business - [ ] has none for this session.

STAT

ITEM 6      Next Meeting Wed 21 August 1985.

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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SECOM: Harrassments and Provocations Study

FROM

NO.

DATE

15 August 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/POL BR

2. C/PPG

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Attached is a response to SECOM regarding subject. SECOM extended the original deadline to 20 August to accommodate input from SAG and CI Staff.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Director of Security

25X1

SUBJECT: Harrassments and Provocations Study

1. This memorandum is in response to Chairman, SECOM's request to provide updated material to the SECOM Harrassments and Provocations Study.

2. The input forwarded has been obtained from the Office of Security, Security Analysis Group and from this Agency's Counterintelligence Staff. As requested, this material is in "raw" form. It is understood that the SECOM staff will use this material as basic and will prepare the final drafts in unclassified form which will be returned for review and comment prior to publication.

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:OS/P&M/PPG [REDACTED] (15 August 85)! 25X1

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee**

**SECOM-D-176  
25 June 1984**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members**

**FROM:**

[Redacted]

**Chairman**

25X1

**SUBJECT: Update of SECOM Harassments and Provocations Study**

1. Attached is a first draft of an update of the June 1982 SECOM Study of Harassments and Provocations. Anecdotal accounts in the attachment are sanitized summaries of classified and unclassified material submitted by Community departments and agencies in the spring of 1984. Please advise if the draft may properly be published at the unclassified (For Official Use Only) level as was the case with the 1982 study. Issuance at that level makes the study broadly useful for defensive briefings of a wide range of personnel, including dependents. Pending member responses on the classification issue, the attachment is tentatively marked Confidential.

2. It would be desirable to include more current material in the updated study, particularly items reflecting current experience in the Soviet Union now that Chernenko has come and gone and the Soviets seem less interested in detente. It would be especially useful if material could be provided on the experiences of travelers and tourists visiting Communist countries as well as on assignees. Please provide any additional material that can be included in the study.

3. Responses on the classification issue and current material should be provided the SECOM staff by 23 July 1985.

[Redacted]

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**Attachment  
As Stated**

[Redacted]

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL****ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SECOM: Harassments and Provocations Study

FROM:

NO.

DATE

1 July 1985

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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CI Staff

5 Jul

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SECOM is updating the June 1982 study of Harassments and Provocations against Americans assigned to, or traveling in, the USSR, Eastern Europe and China. The "anecdotes" are intended to support official defensive security briefings for persons with access to classified information who are traveling to those areas.

Attached, for your information, is a copy of the previous study of Harassments and Provocations, SECOM-D-222, dated 24 June 1982.

It is requested that DD/PTAS route the tasking to the appropriate Area Security Officers.

Please provide updates to this study to PPG by COB, Wednesday, 17 July 1985.

Questions may be directly to

Attachment

cc: C/EAB  
C/SAG  
C/SEG

*CI Staff submission attached -*

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

**For Official Use Only**

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# **A Study of Harassments and Provocations**

**Prepared for  
The Director of  
Central Intelligence  
by the  
Security Committee**

**For Official Use Only**

*SECOM-D-222  
24 June 1982*

For Official Use Only

## INTRODUCTION

This study describes harassments and provocations against Americans assigned to or traveling in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China. The cases cited illustrate procedures used by Communist country intelligence and security services and are intended to support official defensive security briefings for persons with authorized access to classified information who are traveling to those areas. Material in this study was contributed by US Government departments and agencies and describes incidents occurring in the 1978-81 period.

For purposes this study:

**HARASSMENT** means any action taken against a person or group to prevent, inhibit, or delay the achievement of personal or group objectives (e.g., impeding collection of information by assigned diplomats).

**PROVOCATION** means any action taken against a person or group to induce self-damaging action (e.g., attempts to involve Americans in illegal activities).

Attempts by hostile services to recruit Americans to commit espionage are outside the purview of this study.

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5549  
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5408  
BT  
UNCLAS HELSINKI 02072

DEPARTMENT FOR CA/OCS/EMR AND EUR/SOV

E.O. 12356 N/A  
TAGS: CASC (SIPPLE, REGINA)  
SUBJECT: EXPULSION OF AMCIT FROM USSR

1. MS. REGINA SIPPLE, BORN OCTOBER 29, 1952 IN COLORADO,  
[REDACTED] ISSUED SAN FRANCISCO MAY 20, 1983,  
CALLED AT EMBASSY ON MAY 13 TO REPORT THAT SHE HAD BEEN  
DENIED ENTRY TO THE SOVIET UNION.

2. MS. SIPPLE ARRIVED MOSCOW ON MAY 12 WITH HER TOUR  
GROUP. SHE SAYS THAT UPON SEARCHING HER LUGGAGE SOVIET  
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS DISCOVERED TAPED CHILDRENS'S MUSIC  
ACCOMPANYING SMALL BOOKLETS. THE BOOKLETS CONTAINED THE  
"SERMON ON THE MOUNT" PRINTED IN ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN ON  
FACING PAGES. SHE WAS ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO SMUGGLE  
BANNED LITERATURE INTO THE USSR AND THE MATERIAL WAS  
CONFISCATED.

3. AFTER BEING DETAINED OVERNIGHT SHE WAS REQUIRED TO  
RETURN TO HELSINKI. SHE CAME DIRECTLY FROM AIRPORT TO  
EMBASSY. WE HAVE ARRANGED HOTEL ACCOMMODATION FOR HER AT  
THE RED CROSS (PUNAINEN RISTI) HOTEL, TEHTAANKATU 1,  
TELEPHONE 176811. SHE IS ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE AIRLINE  
TICKETS FOR RETURN TO U.S. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. MS. SIPPLE HAS ASKED THAT HER PARENTS BE NOTIFIED  
THAT SHE IS WELL AND THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN FOR  
HER WELFARE. PARENTS ARE MR. AND MRS. CHARLES SPENCER,  
[REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

STAT

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**SECRET****ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Update of SECOM'S Study of Harassments and Provocations

<b>FROM:</b>		<b>EXTENSION</b>		<b>NO.</b>
<input type="text"/> Chief, Security Analysis Group				<b>DATE</b> 08 August 1985
<b>TO:</b> (Officer designation, room number, and building)		<b>DATE</b>		<b>OFFICER'S INITIALS</b>
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12 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Plans Group

ATTENTION:

25X1

FROM:

Chief, Security Analysis Group

SUBJECT: Update of SECOM'S Study of Harassments and  
Provocations

25X1

1. Attached herewith are examples of harassments and provocations for inclusion in the SECOM Study of Harassments and Provocations. Recruitment attempts are not included as previous memoranda stated that recruitment attempts are outside the purview of the SECOM study.

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2. Case 1 can be utilized in an unclassified version of the booklet. Case 2 was derived from information contained in a report of another U. S. Government Agency and must be classified at the secret level.

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Attachments

25X1

SECRET

Unclassified

CASE 1

During 1984/85 Soviet and Eastern Bloc media on a continuing basis published or broadcast information purporting to identify CIA officers. Some of their speculations are correct but many are not. One of the major thrusts of this activity is to simply harass the individual and embarrass the U. S. Government.

Unclassified

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**CONFIDENTIAL****ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SECOM: Harassments and Provocations Study

FROM:

NO.

25X1

DATE

1 July 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DD/PTAS

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C/OPS/PTAS

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DD/PSI

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C/OPS/PSI

3 JUL  
1985

SECOM is updating the June 1982 study of Harassments and Provocations against Americans assigned to, or traveling in, the USSR, Eastern Europe and China. The "anecdotes" are intended to support official defensive security briefings for persons with access to classified information who are traveling to those areas.

Attached, for your information, is a copy of the previous study of Harassments and Provocations, SECOM-D-222, dated 24 June 1982.

It is requested that DD/PTAS route the tasking to the appropriate Area Security Officers.

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Please provide updates to this study to PPG by COB, Wednesday, 17 July 1985.

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Attachment

cc: C/EAB  
C/SAG  
C/SEG

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

**For Official Use Only**

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# **A Study of Harassments and Provocations**

**Prepared for  
The Director of  
Central Intelligence  
by the  
Security Committee**

**For Official Use Only**

*SECOM-D-222  
24 June 1982*

For Official Use Only

## INTRODUCTION

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For purposes this study:

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## CONCLUSIONS

Security officers of organizations whose personnel are authorized access to national security information should give them advance, defensive security briefings whenever they are to travel to Communist countries. Briefings should illustrate tactics and procedures used in harassments and provocations.

The importance of immediate reporting to the nearest US diplomatic post of actual or suspected incidents should be emphasized. Those being briefed should be told that, while acknowledging embarrassing of foolish acts is not pleasant or easy, failure to report all incidents involving them exposes them to the prospect of even more serious follow-up action by hostile intelligence agencies without the opportunity for the US Government to protect them. Further, failure to report denies other Americans the informa-

tion they should have to avoid problems during their own travel. Assurances should be given that US authorities will provide all possible assistance to help Americans who are the victims of reported harassments or provocations. The continued usefulness of studies such as this depends on receipt of information describing new harassments and provocations. Security officers using this publication are encouraged to contact persons from their organizations who are returning from travel to Communist countries to determine what they experienced or saw in the way of actual or apparent harassments or provocations. Pertinent information obtained through these contacts should be reported through appropriate channels to the security component of the Government department or agency with security cognizance over your organization.

For Official Use Only

# 'Harassment' in Leningrad Leads to U.S. Warning for Travelers

By John M. Goshko  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department, citing "approximately a dozen cases of flagrant harassment" of Americans in Leningrad during the past six months, yesterday issued a "travel advisory" warning U.S. citizens that they face danger of arrest and denial of access to U.S. officials if they visit that Soviet city.

The advisory followed an incident Thursday in which a Marine guard assigned to the U.S. consulate there was beaten by Soviet police.

Department spokesman Alan Romberg also disclosed yesterday that an American professor was arrested by plainclothes police in Leningrad on July 28 and held for two hours without being allowed to contact the consulate.

"Today's advisory on Leningrad is the first to caution Americans traveling there that the U.S. government cannot guarantee that the Soviet Union will adhere to provisions of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular convention, stipulating the right of access to consular officials in the event of arrest or detention," a department statement said.

Department officials said advisories have been issued in the past about Soviet travel. But, they noted, the earlier advisories have involved possible problems in obtaining visas or hotel rooms in some parts of the Soviet Union.

The officials said Leningrad was singled out because the majority of serious incidents occurred there. Some cases, beginning with an attack on a U.S. consular official last April, have been publicized previously, but yesterday's advisory indicated a widespread pattern of incidents involving private American travelers as well as U.S. officials.

The officials said the frequency of incidents in the Leningrad area could not be ascribed solely to tension between the Reagan administration and the Soviet government.

They gave as one possible explanation the fact that the police and KGB officials in Leningrad have a reputation for being especially

ing visas or hotel rooms in some parts of the Soviet Union.

They also said that after a Korean Air Lines jetliner was shot down by a Soviet plane last September, an advisory warned that travelers in the Soviet Union might have trouble obtaining plane tickets.

Leningrad rivals Moscow as the principal center for foreign tourists in the Soviet Union, and the advisory reflected what U.S. officials said was a desire to protect Americans from possible danger and to emphasize to the Soviet government U.S. concern about "unsatisfactory Soviet responses" in dealing with the situation.

tough in dealing with suspected breaches of state security.

"There have been several cases of unlawful detention of tourists by the Soviet security organs following innocent contacts with Soviet citizens," the advisory said. "During detention, Americans have been denied their rights, under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular convention, to communicate with an American consular officer and to be visited by him without delay. American tourists have been subjected to arbitrary and in many cases unjustifiably embarrassing searches of their personal effects . . ."

In describing the July 28 incident, Romberg said an American profes-

sor, whom he would not identify, was arrested on the way to a meeting with a Soviet scholar who specializes in 18th century literature and was held at a police station for two hours. Romberg said the professor was told "that a new Soviet law which took effect on July 1 did not require that foreigners be granted access to their consular representatives unless they were being deported."

Other incidents involved an assault on U.S. vice consul Ronald Harms as he was leaving a restaurant after lunching with a dissident contact in April, and the severe beating in June of Andrew Espinosa, an American exchange student.

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CONFIDENTIAL

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revision of DCID 1/14 re Off-Duty Activities

FROM:

NO.

DATE

18 July 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/Policy Branch

Attached is the response to SECOM regarding subject indicating concurrence with the proposed revision, with two exceptions as noted.

3. C/PPG

The document differs from Agency guidance in two areas:

5. DD/P&amp;M

- ° OS requires reporting "prior to" initiation of such activities, not "immediately after" as suggested in paragraph one.

7. DD/S

- ° Prepublication review is clearly spelled out for those with access.

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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SECOM-D-174: Revision of DCID 1/14 re Off-Duty Activities

FROM

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Chairman, SECOM

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

  
Director of Security

STAT

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/14 re Off Duty Activities

REFERENCE: SECOM-D-174, dtd 24 June 1985, Same Subject

1. This memorandum is in response to referenced request to comment on the proposed new paragraph 11 of DCID 1/14 which provides security policy guidance concerning off duty activities of persons holding or being considered for SCI access when those activities might conflict with security obligations. The following comments are offered:

° Paragraph 1. - The last sentence should be changed to read, "For those with access, reporting will be in writing to their cognizant security officer prior to (vice 'immediately following') initiation of employment or activities of potential concern". Part of the rationale for such reporting includes the opportunity for the Security Officer to make a security judgment prior to the individual's involvement in the activity.

° Paragraph 3. - The responsibility to submit documents for prepublication review should be more forcefully highlighted in the revision since those individuals with SCI access are required to sign such an agreement.

2. It is recommended that the above suggestions be incorporated into the revision of DCID 1/14.

  
STAT

Date

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

07/19

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
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Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

Attached is a "dirty" draft of the memo that I am sending you on the SECOM agenda item.

I did not attach the Memo of Agreement examples because I needed some  documents made.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FR <input type="text"/>	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
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FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

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